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I. INTRODUCTION
Minnesota, like many other states, requires the inclusion of an
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incontestability clause in insurance contracts.' However, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court has never addressed the incontestability
clause as a bar to the defense of pre-existing conditions.2 In Kersten
v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co.,3 the Minnesota Supreme
Court recently reviewed the incontestability clause as it applies to
pre-existing conditions.
This note addresses the incontestability clause as it applies to
those conditions that first manifest themselves prior to the com-
mencement of the policy. An incontestability clause acts as a statute
of limitations to limit the insurer from challenging the validity of
the contract after a period of time. Minnesota, like a majority of
the states, statutorily mandates that the incontestability clause be
inserted into the insurance policy.
5
Recently, insurance companies have begun to insert a "first
manifestation" clause into the definition of "sickness" in order to
exclude coverage for pre-existing conditions.6 The first manifesta-
tion clause defines "sickness" as those conditions that first manifest
while the insurance policy is in force.7 The "first manifest" doctrine
permits insurers to use a first manifestations definition of "sickness"
to deny a pre-existing condition." Thus, the insured is no longer
protected from invalidation of the policy after the two year time
period for inadvertently failing to disclose pre-existing conditions.
1. MINN. STAT. § 62A.04, subd. 2 (2000). Specific clauses must be contained
within an insurance policy in order to be valid. Id. Forty-three states require in-
contestability clauses by statute in life insurance policies, and in many states incon-
testability clauses are used in health and annuity policies. Infra note 29 and ac-
companying text.
2. Infra note 42 and accompanying text.
3. 608 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. 2000). The issue stated in Kersten was whether the
statutorily required condition provisions of Minnesota Statute section 62A.04,
subd. 2(2) (b) preclude Minnesota Mutual from using a definition of "sickness"
that required the sickness to first manifest itself while the policy was in force. Id. at
871.
4. Katherine Cooper, Liar's Poker: The Effect of Incontestability Clauses After Paul
Revere Life Insurance Co. v. Haas, 1 CONN. INS. L.J. 225, 227 (1995).
5. MINN. STAT. § 62A.04 (2000).
6. Neville v. Am. Republic Ins. Co., 912 F.3d 813, 814 (5th Cir. 1990).
7. For cases addressing insurance polices using a "first manifest" definition
of "sickness," Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States v. Bell, 27 F.3d
1274, 1276 (7th Cir. 1994); Mass. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Forman, 516 F.2d 425, 430 (5th
Cir. 1975); Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 644 A.2d 1098, 1104 (N.J. 1994).
8. David G. Newkirk, An Economic Analysis of the First Manifest Doctrine: Paul
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In Kersten,9 the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the first
manifestation doctrine and held that Minnesota's statutorily man-
dated incontestability clause bars insurers from asserting the de-
fense that a condition first manifested itself prior to the com-
mencement of the policy.10 In Kersten, the insured inadvertently
failed to disclose a pre-existing condition prior to the commence-
ment of the policy." Minnesota Mutual had enclosed a provision in
the policy defining "sickness" as those conditions that "first mani-
fest" while the policy is in force. 12 The Minnesota Supreme Court
ruled for the insured, stating that the "first manifest" definition of
"sickness" put the insured in a worse position than the statutorily
mandated incontestability clause. 13 The court followed other "first
manifest" cases in examining the plain language of the statute as
well as examining the legislative intent of the incontestability
clause. 4
This case note will first examine the development of the incon-
testability clause and then explore cases addressing the first mani-
fest doctrine. Part III examines the facts of the case as well as the
majority and dissent's analysis in the Kersten decision. Part IV dis-
cusses the court's analysis and the effects of the decision. This note
will conclude that the Minnesota Supreme Court has upheld public
policy by its interpretation of the plain language of the incontest-
ability clause and protecting both the insurer and the insured's
rights.
II. HISTORY
A. The Roots Of The Incontestability Clause
An incontestability clause acts like a statute of limitations to
prohibit insurance companies from contesting the validity of the
policy.-5 It deprives the insurer, after a passage of a stated period,
of the right to declare the policy invalid based on fraud or misrep-
resentations made by the insured.16 The time period varies, but
9. 608 N.W.2d 869 (Minn. 2000).
10. Id. at 878.
11. Id. at 871.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 877.
14. Id. at 876-77 (citing Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States v.
Bell, 27 F.2d 1274, 1274 (7th Cir. 1994) and Wischmeyer v. Paul Revere Life Ins.
Co., 725 F. Supp. 995, 995 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
15. Cooper, supra note 4, at 227.
16. 43AM.JUR. 2D Insurance § 775 (1982).
2000] 1255
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many incontestability clauses state that after two years the insurer is
barred from declaring the policy invalid. 7
Incontestability clauses have been in effect for over one hun-
dred and fifty years to assure customers that their claims will be
paid. Is Incontestability clauses were initiated as a marketing device
to increase public trust in insurance companies.' 9
An English insurer, Indisputable Life Insurance Company, was
the first insurance company to insert an incontestability clause into
its policy in 1848." Before incontestability clauses were used, the
insured commonly paid premiums for a long period of time and
the insurance company would later void the contract for a minor
reason when the payment of benefits was due." The incontestabil-
ity clause was implemented in England in order to address the un-
certainty of the insurer's obligation to honor the policy after the in-
sured died, when the beneficiaries' benefits were due.2 The early
English clauses excepted fraud of the insured from the incontest-
able clause, and this idea continued in America.23
In 1864, the Manhattan Life Insurance Company was the first
American company to offer a policy containing an incontestability
24clause. The Manhattan Life Insurance Company introduced the
incontestability clause as a sales measure to combat America's skep-
ticism of the insurance industry.2 ' Incontestability clauses became
established in American insurance policies after the Equitable Life
26Assurance Company implemented the clause in its policies. By
1895, seven American insurance companies had adopted the in-
contestability clause and by the turn of the century the use of the
21clause was common practice.
17. BETRAM HARNETT & IRVING I. LESNICK, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE ANNO-
TATED § 5.07 (2000).
18. JANICE E. GREIDER & WILLIAM T. BEADLES, LAW AND THE LIFE INSURANCE
CONTRACT 237 (1968); see also Cooper, supra note 4, at 225.
19. GREIDER & BEADLES, supra note 18, at 225.
20. Newkirk, supra note 8, at 825.
21. MURIEL L. CRAWFORD & WILLIAM T. BEADLEs, LAW AND THE LIFE INSURANCE
CONTRACr 423 (6th ed. 1989).
22. HARNETr & LESNICK, supra note 17, § 5.07.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing W. BUCK, THE OLD RELIABLE, AN ACCOUNT OF THE FIRST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF THE MANHATTAN LIFE INS. CO. 1850-1950, 32 (1950)).
26. HARNETr & LESNICK, supra note 17, § 5.07
27. Id. (stating that by 1895, Prudential, Northwestern Mutual, New York Life,
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In 1905, the Armstrong Commission in New York and the
"Committee of Fifteen" in Chicago developed model insurance
policies and incontestability clauses. 2s In 1946, the National Asso-
ciation of Insurance Commissioners drafted a model incontestabil-
ity clause statute that has been adopted by at least 47 states.2 9 Forty-
three of the states have incontestability clauses contained in life in-
surance polices, while four states have incontestability provisions
covering various types of insurance policies. Only three states,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Wyoming have no express statu-
torily mandated incontestability clause.
28. Newkirk, supra note 8, at 826. See also Eric K. Fosaaen, AIDS and the Incon-
testability Clause, 66 N.D. L. REv. 267, 269 (1990). The Armstrong Commission was
led by Senator William W. Armstrong, and conducted an investigation into the in-
surance industry. Id. In 1906, a national conference in Chicago attended by gov-
ernors, attorneys general, and insurance commissioners formed the "Chicago Fif-
teen." Id. Following the Armstrong Investigation in 1907, New York enacted the
Standard Policy Law requiring incontestability clauses in all life insurance policies.
Id.
29. Fosaaen, supra note 28, at 295 n.27; see also HARNETr & LESNICK, supra
note 17, § 5.07 (listing the following states as statutorily mandating an incontest-
ability clause in life insurance contracts: ALA. CODE § 27-15-4, 27-15-15 (2000);
ALASKA STAT. § 21.45.040 (Michie 1962 & West Supp. 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-1204 (West 1956); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 23-81-105(a) (Michie 1987 & West Supp.
2000); CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.5(West 1954); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-7-102 (1988);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2908 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.455 (West 2000); GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-25-7(Harrison 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:1OD-102(3) (1968);
IDAHO CODE § 41-1905 (Michie 1948); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/231.1 (1993); IND.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-12-6(Michie 1978); IOWA CODE ANN. § 508.28 (West 1949); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 40-420(2) (1964); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.15-080 (Michie 1971); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:170(West 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24A, § 2507 (West
1964); MD. CODE ANN., ART. 48A § 390 (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, §
132 (West 1958); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.4014 (West 2000); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 62A.04, subd. 2 (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-20-105 (2000); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 44-502 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 688A.989 (Michie 1986); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 408:10 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:25-4 (West 2000); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 59A-20-5 (Michie 1999); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3203 (McKinney 1939);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3911.07 (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4004
(West 1936); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.168 (1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 510 (West
2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-63-220 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 38-63-
220 (Michie 1978); TENN. CODEANN. § 56-7-301 (1955); TEX. CODEANN. § 56-7-301
(Vernon 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-403 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3731
(2000); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-3107, 38.2-3110 (Michie 1950); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 48.23.050 (West 2000); W. VA. CODE § 33-13-4 (2000); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
632.46(2) (West 2000))
30. HARNETr & LESNICK, supra note 17, § 5.07. Connecticut, Mississippi, Mis-
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B. The Development Of The Incontestability Clause
Early decisions inconsistently interpreted the function of the
incontestability clause. Some courts construed the incontestability
clause strictly as a bar to all defenses.33 Other courts held that the
incontestability clause acted as a bar to defenses concerning only
the terms in the contract.34 However, the courts uniformly barred
fraud as a defense after the passage of time contained in the incon-
testability clause.35
In 1930, the Conway decision settled the various interpretations
of incontestability clauses. 6 The Conway decision is the milestone
case discussing the incontestability clause that many courts rely
upon when interpreting the validity of incontestability clauses."
In Conway, Judge Cardozo rejected the idea that an incontest-
ability clause acts as a mandate of absolute coverage for all risks not
specifically excluded in the state's incontestability clause.3s  Car-
dozo concluded that liability did not exist where the insurer has
32. Fosaaen, supra note 28, at 272-73.
33. Id.; Plottner v. N.W. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 183 N.W. 1000, 1000 (N.D.
1921) (barring defenses to recover amount in insurance policy that contained pro-
vision stating that after the expiration of one year, the policy was incontestable).
34. Fosaaen, supra note 28, at 272 (citing Scarborborough v. Am. Nat'l Ins.
Co., 88 S.E. 482, 482 (N.C. 1916)). In Scarborough, the court held that the inclu-
sion of an incontestability clause in the insurance policy meant the policy will not
be contested. Id. at 483. The court held that the incontestability clause did not
waive the right of the insurance company to defend against a risk it never in-
tended to assume. Id.
35. Fosaaen, supra note 28, at 272. Early decisions barred all defenses after
the passage of time contained in the incontestability clause. Id.
36. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 169 N.E. 642, 642 (N.Y. 1930). In Conway,
Metropolitan wanted to insert a rider into its insurance policy. Id. The rider was
to except the death of insureds resulting from "service, travel or flight in any spe-
cies of air craft, except as a fare-paying passenger." Id. ChiefJudge Cardozo held
that the incontestability statute only prohibited contents of validity of the policy.
Id. at 643.
37. E.g., Nat'l Life & Accounting & Ins. Co. v. Mixon, 282 So. 2d 308, 320
(Ala. 1973); Crawford v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States, 305
N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ill. 1973); Fisher v. United States Life Ins. Co., 249 F.2d 404, 407
(Md. 1957); Rasmussen v. Neb. Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 170 N.W.2d 370, 370 (Iowa
1965); Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 644 A.2d 1098, 1104 (N.J. 1994).
38. Conway, 169 N.E. at 642. The Conway court stated:
The provision that a policy shall be incontestable after it has been in
force during the lifetime of the insured for a period of two years is not a
mandate as to coverage, a definition of the hazards to be borne by the in-
surer. It means only this, that within the limits of the coverage the policy
shall stand, unaffected by any defense that it was invalid in its inception,
or thereafter became invalid by reason of a condition broken.
1258 [Vol. 27:2
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not assumed the risk at issue and did not extend the scope of cov-
erage of the policy.' 9
Following Conway, in 1947, the Life Insurance Association of
America and the American Life Convention formed a committee to
draft model insurance statutes. 40 A total of 27 states have adopted
similar statutory limitations to the incontestability clause.4'
Since Conway, the debate as to whether incontestability clauses
are effective to limit the coverage, or simply T rohibit the insurer
from denying validity of the policy continues. Insurance compa-
39. Id. at 643. See also HARNETr & LESNICK, supra note 17, § 5.07.
40. Fosaaen, supra note 28, at 275-76. This committee became known as the
Holland Committee. Id. The Holland Committee was formed by the insurance
industry in response to the growing number of decisions that interpreted the in-
contestability clause broadly. Id. The model statute read:
A clause in any policy of life insurance providing that such policy shall be
incontestable after a specified period shall preclude only a contest of the
validity of the policy, and shall not preclude the assertion at any time of
defenses based upon provisions in the policy which exclude or restrict
coverage, whether or not such restrictions or exclusions are excepted in
such clause.
Id.
41. Id. Fosaaen lists the following states as having enacted a statute similar to
the clause provided by the Holland Committee: ALA. CODE § 27-15-15
(1986)(enacted 1967); ALASKA STAT. § 2145-160 (enacted 1966) (Michie 1962);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1217 (West 1975) (enacted 1954); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-
83-111(b) (Michie 1962)(enacted 1959); CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.5 (West Supp.
1999) (enacted 1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3114 (1975) (enacted 1953); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 627.463 (West Supp. 1999) (enacted 1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-2509
(Harrison 1994) (enacted 1960); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431-542 (enacted 1985)(1968);
IDAHO CODE § 41-1916 (Michie 1999) (enacted 1961); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-12-
41(b)(2) (Michie Supp. 1999)(enacted 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.15-170
(Michie 1971)(enacted 1970); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:170(B)(5) (West 1973)
(enacted 1959); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24A, § 2615(2) (West 1964 & Supp.
1999)(enacted 1969); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 688A.170 (Michie 1986)(enacted
1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:25-16 (West 1939 & Supp. 1999) (enacted 1971); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 59A-20-16 (Michie 1999) (enacted 1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-33-
11(2) (1959 & Supp. 1999) (enacted 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 4015 (West
1936 & Supp. 1999)(enacted 1957); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.168(2) (1988) (enacted
1967); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-15-11 (Michie 1978) (enacted 1966); VA. CODE.
ANN. § 38.2-3110 (Michie 1950 & Supp. 1999) (enacted 1952); W. VA. CODE § 33-
13-16 (1966) (enacted 1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 26-16-115 (Michie 1989) (enacted
1967). Fosaaen, supra note 28, at 295 n.67 (providing list of states and statutes).
42. Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Construction of Incontestable Clause Applicable to Dis-
ability Insurance, 67 A.L.R.5th 513, 513 (1999); see also Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y of the United States v. Poe, 143 F.3d 1013 (6th Cir. 1998); Equitable Life As-
surance Soc'y of the United States v. Bell, 27 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 1994); Neville v.
Am. Republic Ins. Co., 912 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1990); Oglesby v. Penn. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 889 F. Supp. 770 (D. Del. 1995); Galanty v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 97
Cal. Rptr.2d 67 (Cal. 2000); Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 644 A.2d 1098 (N.J.
2000] 1259
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nies reject coverage of pre-existing conditions by inserting "first
manifest" policy language to deny coverage of pre-existing condi-
tions.4' The "first manifest" doctrine has developed over time and
court decisions are split as to whether the doctrine is valid.
1. The First Manifestation Doctrine
Insurers began to use "first manifest" language in insurance
policies to circumvent the requirement of incontestability clauses
for the purpose of excluding pre-existing conditions. 4 The first
manifest doctrine permits insurance companies to use the "first
manifest" definition in order to limit the scope of coverage of the•• 45
policy from including pre-existing or concealed conditions. Many
insurance companies insert the "first manifest" language into the
policy's definition of "sickness" to protect themselves against poten-
tial insured's concealing any pre-existing conditions. The first
manifestation definition of sickness distinguishes between those
conditions that exist and manifest themselves before the com-
mencement of the policy and those conditions that exist before the
commencement of the policy but have not yet manifested them-
selves.47
Insurance companies argue that the courts extend the policy's
coverae by not permitting the use of "first manifest" policy lan-
guage. Cases addressing the "first manifest" doctrine demonstrate
the disagreement as to whether an incontestability clause extends
coverage of the policy to cover pre-existing conditions when the in-
surer has exempted them in a definition of "sickness," or whether it
only affects the validity of the policy.
49
2. First Manifestation Cases
Many state and federal courts have addressed the "first mani-
1994).
43. Newkirk, supra note 8, at 821-22.
44. Id.
45. Aaron A. Haak, Callahan v. Mutual Life Insurance of New York: Incontestabil-
ity Clause as a Bar to "First Manifest" Policy Provisions, 23 AM.J. TRIAL ADvoc. 231,231
(1999); E.g., Haas, 622 A.2d at 1106; Mass. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Forman, 516 F.2d 425,
428-31 (5th Cir. 1975).
46. Haak, supra note 45 at 231-32; see also Bell, 27 F.3d at 1277-83.
47. Haak, supra note 45, at 231-32; see also Bell, 27 F.3d at 1277-83.
48. Bell, 27 F.3d at 1277; Haas, 644 A.2d at 1103; Wischmeyer v. Paul Revere
Life Ins. Co., 725 F. Supp. 995, 1003-05 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
49. Gilsinger, supra note 42, at 513.
1260 [Vol. 27:2
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festation" doctrine. 50  The Fifth Circuit's holding in Massachusetts
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Forman,51 and the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States v. Bell,52 demon-
strates the division of authority on the "first manifestation" doc-
trine.
In Forman the insurance company issued a policy insuring
against sickness that first manifests itself during the term of the pol-
icy.53 Forman filed a claim for total disability for diabetes.54 After
Forman filed the claim, the insurance company learned of a preex-
isting diabetic condition.5 The court held that the "first manifesta-
tion" provision protected the insurer from the preexisting condi-
56tion known to the insured.
In Bell the Seventh Circuit addressed a similar "first manifesta-
tion" doctrine and held in favor of the insured. 5' The insurer at-
tempted to deny coverage for a preexisting multiple sclerosis con-
50. Haak, supra note 45, at 235. Haak lists the following cases as addressing
the "first manifestation" clause: Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States v.
Poe, 143 F.3d 1013, 1017-20 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding incontestability clause pre-
vented denial of all preexisting conditions); Bell, 27 F.3d at 1283 (stating first
manifest clause is inapplicable); Neville v. Am. Republic Ins. Co., 912 F.2d 813,
815 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that incontestability clause did not require coverage
for a condition that first manifested prior to coverage and the condition was not
covered by "first manifest" language in "sickness" definition); Keaten v. Paul Re-
vere Life Ins. Co., 648 F.2d 299, 300 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (holding the insurer is
not prevented from denying coverage of preexisting conditions); Mass. Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Forman, 516 F.2d 425, 429 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that insurer is not re-
sponsible for preexisting conditions); Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ogelsby, 695 A.2d
1146, 1151 (Del. 1997) (stating that the incontestability statute did not permit un-
der the first manifest policy language absent a provision allowing the insurer to
defend against fraudulent statements); Estate of Doe v. Paul Revere Life Ins.
Group, 948 P.2d 1103, 1116 n.22 (Haw. 1997) (stating that definition describing
"sickness" as those conditions that first manifest them during the policy did not
specifically exclude conditions); Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Ins. Comm'r of Md.,
723 A.2d 891, 896 (Md. 1999) (stating that first manifest definition of sickness was
unenforceable); Kersten v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 594 N.W.2d 263, 267 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1999) (holding that incontestability provision prevented first manifesta-
tion definition of sickness); Haas, 644 A.2d at 1105 (holding insurer was able to
use first manifestation definition of sickness); New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Doe, 93 N.Y.2d 122, 130 (N.Y. 1999) (defining "exist" as covering "only those in-
stances which the applicant is innocent of any knowledge" would contradict the
statutory language). Id.
51. 516 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1975).
52. 27 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 1994).
53. 516 F.2d at 422.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 428.
57. Bell, 27 F.3d at 1283.
2000] 1261
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dition that manifested itself before the commencement of the pol-
icy. The court focused on the difference between the language of
the terms "exist" and "manifest" and held that the term "exist" re-
fers to a state of being, including manifestation. 9 The court dis-
agreed with the Forman court and instead applied the plain mean-
ing of the language contained in the insurance policy.
Current interpretation of incontestability clauses, as they apply
to pre-existing conditions, differs between jurisdictions. 6' Four fed-
eral appellate courts have examined incontestability clauses con-
62taining a "first manifest" clause excluding pre-existing conditions.
Both the federal courts and state courts are split on whether insur-
ance companies may use pre-existing condition clauses to deny
benefits.63  However, the modern trend is to preclude defenses
based on the "first manifestation" doctrine. 64 In Kersten, the Minne-
58. Id. at 1276.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Gilsinger, supra note 42, at 513.
62. Alexander B. Temel, Incontestability Statute Nullifies Contract Language: Equi-
table Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Bell 27 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir 1994), 47
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 271, 275 (1995). See also Bell, 27 F.3d at 1274 (ap-
plying the plain language and meaning of the insurance policy incontestability
clause, construed to prohibit insurance companies from denying coverage based
on a first manifest definition); Button v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins., 847 F.2d 584, 584
(9th Cir. 1988) (holding incontestability clause relates to validity of contract and
not to construction of policy provisions); Mass. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Forman, 516 F.2d
425, 425 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding the "first manifestation" provision in the policy
protected the insurer from coverage for conditions which existing before coverage
became effective).
63. Temel, supra note 62, at 276. The Fifth and the Ninth Circuits have held
that incontestability clauses relate to the validity and not to the coverage of the
policy. Id. However, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits applied the plain language of
the incontestability clause and concluded that defenses to pre-existing conditions
were barred by the incontestability clause. Id. See also Nat'l. Life & Accident Ins.
Co. v. Mixon, 282 So. 2d 308 (Ala. 1973) (holding that no conflict existed between
the statutorily mandated incontestability clause and the pre-existing condition ex-
clusion); Petty v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 166 S.W.2d 1034, 1034 (Ark. 1942); Hooks v.
Colonial Life and Accident Ins. Co., 259 S.E.2d 567, 567 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Ap-
ter v. Home Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 194 N.E. 846, 846 (N.Y. 1935). But see Posner v.
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 106 P.2d 488, 492 (Ariz. 1940) (stating that incontestability
clause did not bar defenses of insurer that disease commenced prior to the date of
the policy); Penn. Mut. Life. Ins. Co. v. Oglesby, 695 A.2d 1146, 1146 (Del. 1997);
Doe v. Paul Revere Ins. Group, 948 P.2d 1103, 1103 (Haw. 1997); Jefferson Stan-
dard Life Ins. v. O'Bryan, 192 So. 2d 263, 265 (Miss. 1966).
64. Temel, supra note 62, at 276. The majority position is to accept a "first
manifest" definition of the term "sickness." Mixon, 282 So. 2d at 314. However, a
"growing minority of courts" have rejected the "first manifest" doctrine. Oglesby v.
Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 889 F. Supp. 770,776 (D. Del. 1995).
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sota Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to construe the
incontestability clause as it relates to conditions manifesting them-
selves before the insurance policy is in force. 6'
III. THE KERSTENDECISION
A. The Facts
On October 18, 1985, John Kersten received a disability insur-
66ance policy from Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company.
The policy provided that if Mr. Kersten became disabled as defined
in the policy as the result of an injury or sickness, he would be enti-
tled to a monthly income benefit.67 The policy contained the req-
uisite incontestability clause. 6' However, the policy defined sickness
as "a disease or illness that first manifests itself while the policy is in
force. ,,69
On September 1993, Mr. Kersten was involved in an automo-S 70
bile accident. Minnesota Mutual began to pay Mr. Kersten disabil-
ity benefits.71 During this time, Mr. Kersten also received no-fault
benefits.72
In July 1994, an independent medical examiner opined that
Mr. Kersten was no longer disabled from the injuries received from
the automobile accident.73 Mr. Kersten's automobile insurance
provider stopped payments.74 An arbitration panel later decided
that Mr. Kersten was not entitled to no-fault benefits.75 Minnesota
76Mutual then discontinued Mr. Kersten's disability benefits. Mr.
Kersten disputed the discontinuation of disability benefits, arguing
65. Kersten v Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 608 N.W.2d 869, 871 (Minn. 2000).
66. Id. at 871.
67. Id.
68. Id. Minnesota Statute section 62A.04 provides:
No claim for loss incurred or disability commencing after two years from
the date of issue of the this policy shall be reduced or denied on the
ground that a disease or physical condition not excluded from coverage
by name or specific description effective on the date of loss had existed
prior to the effective date of coverage of this policy.
MINN. STAT. § 62A.04, subd. 2(2) (b) (2000).
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that the loss of his job and continuing pain resulted in psychologi-
cal disorders.77 Minnesota Mutual argued that Mr. Kersten's psy-
chological disorder was a pre-existing condition, excluded by the
definition of sickness in the 7spolicy, because he was previously
treated for depression in 1974.
The district court granted summary judgment concluding that
Mr. Kersten's claims were collaterally estopped and that Minnesota
Mutual's policy excluded Kersten's pre-existing condition from the
coverage. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded, holding that Minnesota Mutual could not limit coverage
to injuries that "first manifest" themselves after the policy is in
force 8o
B. The Court's Analysis
1. The Majority's Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's
decision for the insured.81 It applied the plain meaning of the stat-
ute, and determined the legislative intent of the statute was to cover
pre-existing conditions after the policy was in effect for two years.82
The court determined that the insurer was able to exclude pre-
existing conditions specifically in the policy. 83 The court also con-
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. The district court determined that Mr. Kersten's claim was collaterally
estopped because an arbitration panel previously decided that he was not entitled
to no-fault benefits for the psychological condition. Id.
80. Kersten v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 594 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999).
81. Kersten, 608 N.W.2d at 878. The court interpreted Minnesota Statute sec-
tion 62A.05 to give guidance on the construction of Chapter 62A by providing that
"no policy provision which is not subject to section 62A.04 shall make a policy, or
any portion thereof, less favorable in any respect to the insured or the beneficiary"
than do the requirements of sections 62A.01 to 62A.09. Id.
82. Id. See also In reWelfare of J.M., 574 N.W.2d 717,721 (Minn. 1998) (con-
cluding that the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, it manifests the
legislative intent and the statute must be given its plain meaning); MINN. STAT. §
645.16 (1998) (providing that when a statute is ambiguous, legislative intent may
be determined by examining other factors such as the circumstances surrounding
the enactment, purpose, need for the law, and the circumstances of giving the law
a certain interpretation).
83. MINN. STAT. § 62A.04, subd.2(2) (b) (1998). See also Wischemeyer v. Paul
Revere Life Ins. Co., 725 F. Supp. 995, 1004-05 (S.D. Ind. 1989). In Wischmeyer, the
court interpreted a statute nearly identical to Minnesota Statute section 62A.04,
subd. 2(2) (b). Id. The court held that the insurer did not specifically exclude
1264 [Vol. 27:2
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cluded that insurance companies were protected from fraud by the
exception in the statute. 4
Relying on Bell,85 the court determined that Minnesota Mu-
tual's "first manifest" definition of illness is less favorable to the in-
86sured. The court stated that full disclosure of both parties is en-
couraged and protected by the statute.8' Affirming the appellate
court, the supreme court stated that Minnesota Mutual's exclusion
of pre-existing conditions was "less favorable" to the insured and
the language contained in the policy. 8s
Rejecting the application of Forman, the court stated that
Fifth Circuit's decision only addressed the applicability of incon-
testability clauses and did not address the "first manifest" language
in question. 90 The majority chose to protect the insurer by examin-
ing the plain language and legislative intent.
2. The Dissent's Opinion
In the dissent, Justice Stringer argued that the majority created
coverage of insurance policies by not permitting the "first manifest"
language of Minnesota Mutual's policy.91 Justice Stringer stated
that an incontestability clause does not preclude the insurer from
demonstrating that the condition is not covered by the policy be-
cause it occurred prior to the commencement of the policy.2
Justice Stringer stated that an incontestability clause is meant
to prohibit insurers from invalidating policies due to an inadver-
pre-existing conditions by stating that pre-existing conditions were not covered by
the policy. Id. at 1005.
84. Kersten, 608 N.W.2d at 875.
85. 27 F.3d 1274 (7th Cir. 1994).
86. Kersten, 608 N.W.2d at 876. In Bell, the court analyzed a statute similar to
Minnesota Statute section 62A.04. Id. The Bell court stated that the purpose of
including a pre-existing condition clause is to avoid situations similar to that of
Kersten. Id.
87. Id. at 877. The court stated that insurers do not prefer to specifically "by
name or specific description" refuse coverage to a potential insured for a "disease
or physical condition" for which the insured has a reasonable concern may cause
future disability. Id. However, the legislature requires that pre-existing condition
be excluded by specific description in order to assure that the insured knows of
the coverage received. Id.
88. Id.
89. 516 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1975).
90. Kersten, 608 N.W.2d at 876.
91. Id. at 879 (Stringer, J., dissenting).
92. Id. (citing 18 GEORGE J COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 72:61, at 329
(Ronald A. Anderson ed., 2d ed. 1983)).
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tent misstatement; however, it is not meant to create additional95
coverage. The dissent believed that Kersten's depression was not
a condition within the scope of the policy coverage because it did4
not manifest itself during the policy. Therefore, the first manifes-
tation definition precluded coverage for Mr. Kersten's pre-existing
condition.5
Justice Stringer examined the effect of the incontestability
clause on indemnification of insurance policies and concludes that
the insurer is not supposed to bear the risk of pre-existing condi-
tions.96 The dissent addressed the fact that the majority claims the
"first manifest" policy language makes the policy "less favorable" to
the insured.97 However, Justice Stringer stated that the policy de-
fines the risks to which the parties agreed, and that the Commis-
sioner of Commerce approved the "first manifest" language.9s
V. ANALYSIS
A. Minnesota Supreme Court Protects The Rights Of The Insured And
Insurer
Kersten represents a state supreme court making new policy ob-
jectives in the insurance industry. Although Kersten is a case of first
impression in Minnesota, this issue has been examined in otherju-
risdictions.9 The Minnesota Supreme Court relied on the other
jurisdictions' interpretation of incontestability clauses and applied
93. Kersten, 608 N.W.2d at 879-80 (Stringer, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 880.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 878. The dissent states that the insurer does not assume the risk of
pre-existing conditions, but the insurer only assumes risks of conditions that mani-
fest after the policy commences. Id. at 879.
97. Id. at 881.
98. Id. The majority states that the letter from the Commissioner of Com-
merce was not properly before the court because it was admitted for the first time
on appeal. Id. at 874. The majority also stated that the letter was not relevant be-
cause it did not address the specific question of pre-existing conditions, and the
court is not bound by decisions of the Commissioner. Id.
99. Id. at 872. See also Gilsinger, supra note 42, at 513; Neville v. Am. Republic
Ins. Co., 912 F.2d 813, 815 (5th Cir. 1990); Keaten v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 648
F.2d 299, 299 (5th Cir. 1981); Mass. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Forman, 516 F.2d 425, 425
(5th Cir. 1975); Paul Revere Life Ins. Co.v. Haas, 644 A.2d 1098, 1098 (N.J. 1994).
But see Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States v. Bell, 27 F.3d 1274, 1274
(7th Cir. 1994); Wischmeyer v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 725 F. Supp. 995, 995
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general contract principles to interpret the statute.'00 The Minne-
sota Supreme Court's decision correctly interpreted the plain lan-
guage of Minnesota's incontestability clause to protect both the in-
sured and insurer.
1. Applying The Plain Language Of The Statute
The Minnesota Supreme Court applied the plain language of
the incontestability clause, following current decisions by the Sixth
and Seventh Circuits.'0 ' The general contract principle that ambi-
guities in insurance policies should be interpreted in favor of the
insured has been upheld to be applicable to incontestable
clauses.'0 2 However, when the incontestability clause is statutorily
mandated, courts have held that the contract should not necessar-
ily be construed in favor of the insured.
In Kersten, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognizes that in-
contestability clauses should be given the "commonsense construc-
100. Kersten, 608 N.W.2d at 872.
101. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States v. Poe, 143 F.3d 1013,
1013 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Bell, 27 F.3d at 1274. The supreme court relied on
Bell and applied a strict interpretation of the Minnesota Statute. Kersten, 608
N.W.2d at 876. The Bell court addressed a provision similar to Minnesota Statute
section 62A.04, subd. 2. Bell, 27 F.3d at 1274. Bell protected the insured against
insurers seeking to deny benefits for pre-existing conditions years after issuing the
policy. Id.
102. Gilsinger, supra note 42, at 513. See also Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Mar-
golis, 53 P.2d 1017 (3d Dist. 1936); Robison v. Bhd. of R. R. Trainmen Ins. Dept.,
241 P.2d 791 (Ariz. 1952); Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Oglesby, 695 A.2d 1146 (Del.
1997); Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Childs, 14 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. Ct. App. 1941);
Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Childs, 16 S.E.2d 103 (Ga. App. 1941); Pac. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Barfield, 194 S.E. 258 (Ga. App. 1937); Doe v. Paul Revere Ins. Group,
948 P.2d 1103, 67 A.L.R.5th 743 (Haw. 1997); Wilson v. Equitable Life Ins. Co.,
262 N.W. 525 (Iowa 1935); Mass. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Vanidestine, 980 F. Supp. 556 (D.
Me. 1997) (applying Maine law); Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Altman,
795 F. Supp. 216 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (applying Michigan law); Berkshire Life Ins.
Co. v. Weinig, 47 N.E.2d 418 (N.Y. 1943); Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., Inc. v.
Schaefer, 519 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y.S. 2d. 1987); White v. Mass. Cas. Ins. Co., 512
N.E.2d 558 (N.Y.S.2d 1987); Fischer v. Mass. Cas. Ins. Co., 458 F. Supp. 939
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying New York law); Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172
F.R.D. 647 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying New York law); Horwitz v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.,
80 F.2d 295 (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1935) (applying Pennsylvania law).
103. Zwirn v. Chubb Life Am., 1994 WL 323148 (N.D. Il. 1994); Bronson v.
Wash. Nat'l. Ins. Co., 59 Ill. App. 2d 253, 257, 207 N.E.2d 172, 174, 13 A.L.R.3d
1375 (2d Dist. 1965); Bell, 27 F.3d at 274 (applying Indiana law); Wischmeyer v.
Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 725 F. Supp. 995 (S.D. Ind. 1989), Paul Revere Life Ins.
Co. v. Haas, 644 A.2d 1098 (N.J. 1994).
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tion. " 10 4 The terms of the incontestability clause should be given a
meaning that a reasonable person would understand. Incontest-
ability clauses originated in order to encourage laypeople to enter
into complex insurance contracts by providing guarantees that the
policy could not be invalidated after a specified time period. 0 6
Thus, the terms of the clause should be given their plain meaning
in order to reflect a layperson's understanding of the policy.' 7
By applying the plain meaning of the statute, the supreme
court reasoned that limiting the incontestability clause by exclud-
ing pre-existing conditions would be contrary to legislative intent.10t
The legislature included the term "pre-existing" in the statute in
order to provide coverage for pre-existing conditions.1°9 Although
Minnesota Mutual argued that the terms "exist" and "manifest" dif-
fer in their meaning, a reasonable person may not recognize the
difference.1 1 °
Using the common meaning of the terms is consistent with the
principle that ambiguities shall be construed in favor of the in-
sured.1 The insured's interpretation of the contract should pre-
vail in order to protect the rights of the insured.I"
2. Minnesota Supreme Court Upholds Public Policy
Public policy upholds incontestability clauses in order to pro-
tect the rights of the insured and the insurer, to promote certainty,
104. Kersten, 608 N.W.2d at 873. See also COUCH, supra note 92, at § 72:9; Coo-
per, supra note 4, at 236.
105. Cooper, supra note 4, at 236.
106. Id.
107. 1A JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN &JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §
311, at 313 (1972).
108. Kersten, 608 N.W.2d at 875.
109. MINN. STAT. § 62A.04, subd. 2(2) (b) (1998).
110. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States v. Bell, 27 F.3d 1274 (7th
Cir. 1994). Bellprovided that the term "exist" in its ordinary term refers broadly to
a state of being, including manifestation. Id. A reasonable person would not
grasp the distinction between existence and manifestation. Id. at 1281-1282. See
also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 574 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "exist" as to "be in pre-
sent force, activity or effect at a given time"). Id. at 962 (defining "manifest" as
"evident to the senses, especially to the sight, obvious to the understanding, evi-
dent to the mind, not obscure or hidden, and is synonymous with open, clear,
visible, unmistakable, indubitable, indisputable, evident and self evident").
111. Kersten, 608 N.W.2d at 873; see also Atwater Creamery Co. v. W. Nat'l. Mut.
Ins. Co., 366 N.W.2d 271, 277 (Minn. 1985).
112. Cooper, supra note 4, at 236.
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and to reduce litigation.1 3 The Minnesota legislature intended the
incontestability clause to protect the insured from the insurer ex-
cluding pre-existing conditions after the two-year time period."
4
An incontestability clause provides the insurer with the incentive to
investigate all claims within a specific time period. Minnesota's in-
contestability clause protects the insurer from fraudulent claims by
allowing the defense of fraud after the two-year limit." 5 In addi-
tion, the insurer is protected because the statute allows for the ex-
clusion of pre-existing conditions by name or specific description."
6
The insured is guaranteed to receive benefits from the insur-
ance policy after the time period has expired. This prevents insur-
ance companies from denying benefits based on unintentional mis-
statements of the insured and prohibits the insurer from denying
the validity of the insurance policies after it has been in effect for
more than two years."'
The incontestability clause provides needed security in health
and life insurance policies by protecting the insured and the in-
sured's beneficiaries from unintentional misstatements.' It acts as
a guarantee to the insured that benefits will be received once the
incontestability time period elapses." 9 By not permitting insurance
companies to liberally exclude all pre-existing conditions from cov-
erage, the court provided certainty to the interpretation of Minne-
sota Statute section 64A.04.1
20
The incontestability clause reduces the costs of insurance poli-
cies for both the insured and insurer. 12 By prohibiting the insur-
113. Id.; see also Wischemeyer v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 725 F. Supp. 995,
1000 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
114. Kersten, 608 N.W.2d at 875.
115. MINN. STAT. § 62A.04, subd.2 (2) (b) (1998). Other states' incontestability
clauses do not provide a clause excluding fraudulent statements, or provide that
the insurer has the option to insert a clause excepting fraudulent statements from
the effect of the incontestability clause. Wischemeyer, 725 F. Supp. at 995; Bell, 27
F.3d at 1274 (stating that Equitable Life could have worded the clause to exclude
fraudulent statements); Magee v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 172 F.R.D. 647
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying New York law); Horwitz v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 80 F.2d 295
(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1935) (applying Pennsylvania law); Morris v. Mo. State Life Ins.
Co., 171 S.E. 740 (W. Va. 1933).
116. MINN. STAT. § 62A.04 (West 2000).
117. Fosaaen, supra note 28, at 267.
118. Cooper, supra note 4, at 225.
119. Id.
120. COUCH, supra note 92, § 72:9.
121. Cooper, supra note 4, at 229 (citing 1AJOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN AP-
PLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 311, at 311 (1972).
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ance company from denying benefits after the incontestability pe-
riod has expired, frivolous litigation concerning misstatements by
the insured is prevented. 122
Incontestability clauses "avoid the problem of relying on stale
evidence in a contract dispute by preventing litigation over infor-
mation provided by the insured years before coverage was
claimed." 23 The plain interpretation of the statute will prevent fur-
ther litigation as to the interpretation of the statute.
B. The Dissent Misconstrues The Coverage Of The Incontestability Clause
Justice Stringer's opinion in Kersten follows the Forman line of124
cases. The dissent misconstrued the majority's opinion by focus-
ing on only the rights of the insurer. Justice Stringer believed that
the majority creates coverage in an insurance policy where none
existed by denying "first manifest" definition of "sickness." 125 How-
ever, the dissent did not address the clause in Minnesota Statute
section 62A.04 which states that the insurer has the right to specifi-
cally exclude certain conditions from the insurance policy.
126
Therefore, the application of the majority decision does not pre-
clude insurers from specifically denying benefits for pre-existing
conditions. Here, Minnesota Mutual failed to specifically state the
conditions to be excluded from coverage and instead created an
overly broad statement to include all pre-existing conditions. 121
Justice Stringer concentrated on the indemnification of risk1. • 128
characteristic of insurance policies. Insurance policies commonly
insure against losses after a certain date.129 The incontestability
clause states that after two years, the insurer bears the risk of cover-
age for pre-existing conditions."' The majority addressed this issue
by stating that the disability is the loss that must occur after the pol-
122. Cooper, supra note 4, at 229-30.
123. Id.
124. E.g., Keaten v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 648 F.2d 299(5th Cir. 1981); Paul
Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 644 A.2d 1098 (N.J. 1998).
125. Kersten v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 608 N.W.2d 869, 879 (Stringer, J., dis-
senting).
126. MINN. STAT. § 62A.04 (West 2000).
127. Kersten, 608 N.W.2d at 871.
128. Id. at 878-79.
129. Id. (quoting 1 JOHN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRAcrICE§ 102, at 330 (1981)).
130. MINN. STAT. § 62A.04 (2000).
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icy is in force."' However, once the policy is in effect for two years,
Minnesota Statute section 62A.04, subd. 2 prohibits the insurer
from denying or reducing coverage due to a pre-existing condi-
tion. 112 Thus, the risk is transferred to the insurer after the policy
133
commences.
C. The Effect Of The Kersten Decision On The Insurance Industry
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Kersten provides
guidance to insurance companies by demonstrating that the plain
language and insured's interpretation of the policy prevails. The
decision requires insurance companies to specifically exclude con-
ditions from the policy instead of generally excepting pre-existing• 134
conditions from the policy. By not permitting a general excep-
tion of conditions, insurance companies will be forced to use the
two-year time period in order to investigate claims.
In fact, insurance companies may need to invest more time
and money into investigation of new insurance policy holders, thus
increasing costs. For the few times that a misstatement is made in a
new insurance policy, insurers must conduct an investigation in or-
der to prevent coverage for pre-existing conditions.
Insurance companies will be required to use the standard
meaning of terms and create insurance policies that are under-
stood by a reasonably prudent person. 1 5 The supreme court pro-
tects the insured by preventing insurance companies from circum-
venting the incontestability clause by inserting a "first
manifestation" definition of "sickness." In addition, the supreme
court demonstrates the tendency to protect the insured over the in-
surer, while considering the rights of the insurer by protectingt- 1 136
against fraud.The Kersten decision allows the allocation of risk to remain in
131. Kersten, 608 N.W.2d at 877 n.2 (stating that the dissent misconstrues the




134. Id. at 873; see also MINN. STAT. § 62A.04, subd. 2(2) (b) (West 2000) (stat-
ing "after a policy has been in force for two years, claims may not be reduced or
denied on the basis that a disease or physical condition existed before the policy
was in force, unless such disease or physical condition has been excluded by name
or specific description").
135. Kersten, 608 N.W.2d at 873.
136. Id. at 875.
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the insurer's control.' The insurer is capable of lowering its risks
by investigating claims within the two-year time period.1 38 After the
two-year time period, the insurer is barred from denying the valid-
ity of the insurance policy and the insurer assumes the risk. In or-
der to decrease the risk, insurers may provide a more exhaustive list
of questions before accepting a new insurance policy.
V. CONCLUSION
The Kersten case settles the question of whether Minnesota's
incontestability clause covers pre-existing conditions. The supreme
court correctly interpreted the incontestability clause by applying
the plain language of the statute. Public policy protects the insured
from the insurance companies denying benefits. The supreme
court equalizes the protection of the insurer and insured. The in-
sured is protected by the strict application of the incontestability
clause. The insurer is protected from fraudulent statements and
has the incentive to investigate all claims. The Minnesota Supreme
Court's interpretation does not allow for exceptions to the incon-
testability clause and prevents further litigation on the statute.
137. Cooper, supra note 4, at 226 (discussing the decision of the New Jersey
court in Paul Revere Life Ins. Co. v. Haas, 644 A.2d 1098 (N.J. 1994) as incorrectly
applying the incontestability clause and placing the judiciary in the role of risk al-
location).
138. Cooper, supra note 4, at 229-30.
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